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Executive summary
Planning and other territorial  policies within Europe are more and more dependant upon its 
relations  with  the  rest  of  the  world.  The  growing  international  flows  (migrants,  trade, 
investments, polluting agents) interact with the European territories; moreover, the vision the 
Europeans have of their place in the world, has a strong impact on the EU’s policies. Many 
political decisions apparently related to purely “internal affairs”, are in fact based on a wider 
conception of the world. 
Three  dominant  representations  of  Europe  in  the  world  are  currently  available:  (i)  the 
“continent”  view,  which  describes  territories  in  the  traditional  –  but  still  active  –  shape of 
continents or civilisation areas; (ii) the “centre-periphery” view, which stresses the dissymmetry 
of the North-South relations; (iii) the “archipelago” view, based on the networking organisation 
of space, which highlights the remote connections of territories. Each of these views provides 
partial evidence of reality. They are not really contradictory, but they have to be distinguished 
because their  territorial  impacts  are quite different,  and because they give rise to different 
European territorial policies. 
(1)  The  “continent”  view  of  Europe  entails  several  assets:  Central  and  Eastern  European 
member states would benefit from subsidies and western private foreign direct investments; 
Trans-European Networks would be implemented at a large European scale, which would be 
favourable to all the European territory; the German territory would become the genuine centre 
of  Europe.  On  the  other  hand,  this  view  drives  to  territorial  shortcomings:  a  “Nimby” 
interpretation  of  the  European  Neighbourhood  Policy  would  have  negative  impacts  on  the 
peripheral parts of the EU’s space; obstructing population exchanges with the neighbourhood 
would hamper the European economy and territory as a whole, and increase its ageing. 
(2) The “centre-periphery” view would quite deeply change the European geography due to a 
greater Euro-Mediterranean economic integration, despite being asymmetrical. More than the 
eastern peripheral parts of the Union, its southern ones would benefit from this change. In the 
short  run,  the  European  economy  would  partly  catch  up  with  its  Asian  and  American 
counterparts, although not on the high-tech basis of the Lisbon Strategy. Nevertheless,  the 
relocation of  the environmental  burden (Dirty-Difficult-Dangerous activities)  to  the  southern 
shore  could  only  be  a  short-term solution.  A  prominent  policy  of  migration  control  would 
diminish the rise of the European Mediterranean rim, and would not reduce the brain drain. 
(3)  The “archipelago”  view would  drive  to  many territorial  advantages:  most  of  the  major 
European cities would become  highly internationalized metropolitan areas; western countries, 
which benefit from such metropolises, would experience a particularly fast economic growth. On 
the other  hand,  territorial  disparities  in  Europe would  increase,  within  Western Europe and 
within the new member states – which would rapidly loose their competitive advantage due to 
the rise of salaries and costs in their capital cities. The destabilisation would be dramatic in the 
Mediterranean neighbouring countries, due to a tough 2010 liberalisation of trade, namely in 
agriculture (rural emigration toward the large cities’ suburbs and toward Europe). 
The paper shows a desirable and feasible vision of Europe that would imply the territorial assets 
of the three former views without their main shortcomings. This vision is based on the idea that 
Europe and its  neighbours represent one major world region,  according to the North-South 
regionalism  that  occurs  between  the  US  and  Mexico,  or  between  Japan  and  its  emerging 
peripheries.  Here,  the  European  Neighbourhood  Policy  becomes  the  key  policy to 
complement the Lisbon Strategy and to enhance all European territorial policies. Completing a 
regulated North-South regionalism in the European region, would imply two main innovations:  
a) along with the four freedoms (goods, services, capital, people), four principles of common 
action should be added:  solidarity with the southern shore of the Mediterranean (and over a 
longer time span with Sub-Saharan Africa);  creation of  meshing networks over  the greater 
regional  territory  (banking  services  connecting  the  two  shores,  integrated  transport  and 
electricity networks,  compatible  patterns  of  higher  education’s  degrees in  order  to  promote 
mobility);  economic  complementary (a  better  sharing  of  the  value  chain  in  agriculture, 
manufacturing and services); common policies for regional public goods (air and sea pollution 
namely). 
b) The tools of the European Regional Policy have to be widely used by such an ENP, in 
order to develop efficient territories, to tackle the many social issues in the South which cannot 
be met without taking the local territories into account, to enhance local actors as a key way for 
democratisation, and in order to coordinate the various European actions in this neighbourhood 
through an Euromed Spatial Development Perspective.
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1. Introduction. The world and the European territory
1.1. How the vision of the world influences the future of the European Territory
A system of description of the world is what Beaverstock, Smith and Taylor propose to call  a 
“metageography”. For P.J. Taylor (2001), “globalization represents a metageographical moment, a 
time when the taken-for-granted way in which, collectively, we organise our knowledge of the 
world as spatial structures is being eroded. Globalization challenges the mosaic metageography of 
states with a new putative network metageography of connections”. But as noticed by Grasland 
(2007) a vision of the world – or metageography - is not a purely scientific production. It is also an 
ideological production or, in other words, a political geography.  
The objective of this paper is to explain what the dominant representations of the situation of 
Europe in the world are actually, and what the consequences of these visions of the world are for 
European spatial planning. We assume that many political decisions which are apparently related to 
purely “internal affairs” of European Union, are in fact based on a wider conception of the situation 
of the world. As stated by Faludi (2005) about the concept of territorial cohesion, we are not facing 
a simple opposition between liberal and social-democrat point of view. The European model of 
society is much more complex and takes its root in wider spatial and historical scales.  
In other words, our conceptions of European spatial planning are strongly grounded in our mental 
representations of the world; the fact that we are not clearly conscious of this scalar relation is a 
real barrier for further progress in political as in scientific fields. We will therefore present firstly a 
brief  overview of  the  three  dominant  views  of  the  world  that  are  used  in  Europe,  and  their 
implications for European policies and territory – including shortcomings for spatial planning (part 
2). Then we give a vision that would not imply such shortcomings (part 3). 
1.2. How the European concepts of territorial planning help to understand the actual situation of 
Europe in the world 
We propose also to explore how concepts elaborated specifically by European experts and decision 
makers for internal policies can be valuable inputs for a better evaluation of the contemporary 
organisation of the world. Polycentrism, territorial cohesion, accessibility to public services, cross-
border  integration  …  are  typical  concepts  of  European  spatial  planning  which  can  be  easily 
transposed at world scale for an evaluation of the present situation or for the elaboration of new 
policy options. As a very simple example, the reader himself can draw the parallel between spatial 
polycentrism in Europe and geopolitical multipolarity at world scale …
Not  only  concepts  but  also  tools  and  methods  are  likely  to  be  transposed  from one scale  to 
another. For example, the spatial analysis tools that have been used for the measure of regional 
disparities between European regions (map of discontinuities, evaluation of barriers, comparison of 
deviations  at  local,  national  and  European  scales)  has  been  proven  to  be  very  useful  when 
transposed to the analysis of the relation between European Union and neighbouring countries in 
project Espon 3.4.1. Qualitative tools like territorial impact assessment (discussed by Böhme and 
Eser elsewhere in this set of papers) or decentralised cooperation are also typical tools of European 
regional policy that could be applied for a renewal of  the external relations of the EU and namely 
its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 
1.3. Modernity and accuracy of an old notion: the region
The most interesting case of scale transposition appears to be related to a very old geographical 
notion, which has also become a basis for European policies: the region. The region has two main 
characteristics that can be of great help for the renewal of the vision of Europe in the world: it is a 
relevant  scale  for  coordination of  sector  policies  (environment,  transport,  innovation,  essential 
services and social protection etc); its growing role in the contemporary spatial organisation and 
territorial policies facilitates locally based bottom-up approaches. Besides, the region happens to be 
the stake of the renewed representation of the World, due to the necessary new design of the 
globalised  World’s  subdivisions  (regions).  In  particular,  we  assume  that  the  North-South 
regionalism  (association  of  closed  and  complementary  industrialised  countries  and  developing 
countries) is a major set of the emerging global spatial organisation. The fourth part of this text 
shows how relevant it could be for the European Union to enlarge the concepts and methods of its 
regional policy, at the scale of the North-South Region in which Europe is nowadays embedded: the 
Euromediterranean Region.  
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2. The three prominent views of the place of Europe in the world and their impact on 
European planning
Various dominant representation of the world are currently available: the “continents” view, which 
describes territories in the traditional – but still active – shape of continents or, more recently, in 
civilisation areas (Huntington 1996); the “centre-periphery” view, which stresses the dissymmetry 
of  the  North-South  relations  and  the  real  but  quickly  decreasing  northern  domination;  the 
“archipelago” view, based on the networking organisation of space, which highlights the remote 
connections of territories1.  
Figure 1. The three dominant views of Europe in the world
    “continent”     “centre-periphery” “archipelago”
 designed & secured borders   old rich centre vs. dynamic peripheries global networks of world 
cities
Each of these views provides partial evidence of the reality of the contemporary world. They are 
not  really  contradictory:  continental  territories  may  have  strong  frontiers  and asymmetrical 
relations  with the developing countries located in their  periphery,  and intense exchanges with 
global  nodes  of  other  parts  of  the  world.  But  these  three  patterns  have  to  be  analytically 
distinguished because (i) they imply different representations of the place of Europe in the world, 
(ii) because their territorial impacts are quite different, and (iii) because they give rise to different 
European planning policies. 
2.1. The “continent" view 
The main political features
In this scheme, the priority is given to the EU’s internal integration, that is to the convergence 
between the new member states and the rest of the Union. Regarding the rest of the world, the 
stress is put on security. The geographical idea here is that Europe is one of the civilisations of the 
world, is strictly circumscribed and defined, should be internally as homogeneous as possible and 
highly  protected  against  external  threats  (illegal  migrations,  environmental  menace,  human 
trafficking...). Borders are of high significance; planning policy is devoted to cohesion (see Espon 
3.2 cohesion scenario and baseline scenario). 
This  could be one interpretation of  the ENP launched in 20042.  Beyond the  EU  27, a “ring of 
friends” (Prodi 2002), from Morocco to Russia, is essential to European stability and development, 
1 See Grataloup (2006).
2 the European Neighbourhood Policy unifies various previous policies and budgets dedicated to the surrounding 
countries: MEDA for Mediterranean countries (“Barcelona process”), Phare for Eastern countries, Tacis for ex-
USSR etc. The new European and Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument concerns: (i) nine Mediterranean 
countries, those of the former Barcelona process, minus Turkey (that benefits from a specific budget), Cyprus 
and Malta, plus Libya; (ii) the three Caucasian countries; (iii) the three eastern countries that are located 
between the EU and Russia (Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus - though the latter is still not included for well known 
political reasons). The Balkan countries are not included because they have been given an entry perspective. 
Nor is Russia, because it has a specific  strategic agreement with the EU - the general goals of which are 
nevertheless quite similar to the ENP’s: create a common space for trade, finance, migrations, training, culture 
and security.
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and, with it, “everything but institutions  should be shared”3.  The goal is to bring there “the four 
freedoms”: free flows of goods, services and people, together with free capital movements. But as 
a matter of fact, since this policy has come into force, agreements have been enhanced for capital 
and investments (through Action Plans that make the neighbours adopt liberalised policy reform in 
order to create transparent markets of capital and receive and protect foreign investments), goods 
and  services  (a  free  trade  zone  including  agricultural  trade  is  scheduled  for  2010  with  the 
Mediterranean neighbours) – but not for people. Restriction to entries in the EU’s territory remains 
high, asylum has become more difficult than it used to be. Lastly, many see this ENP as a way to 
avoid the entrance of Turkey in the European Union, since this policy would – in theory - give to 
Turkey almost all the advantages of a member state. 
Eastward,  this  continent  view is  consistent  with  a  strong European integration  as  an ongoing 
process.  Eastern  new  member  states  already  are,  and  would  be,  favoured  in  the  industrial 
relocation of western firms. Since the beginning of the 1990s, many EU Foreign Direct Investments 
have targeted Central and Eastern European Countries. The fact that their entry in the EU was 
certain has given them credibility for investors. And the move continues: between 2002 and 2006, 
80% of the FDI by Western European investors have reached other Western European countries 
(innovative industries, banks and services) or eastern new member states (automobile industry 
and other manufacturing sectors). The continent is actually becoming  one integrated productive 
system (Hatem 2007). Table 1 shows that during the recent years, the continent has hosted more 
than 40% of the world FDI inward flows, mostly in Western Europe, and more than 30% of the 
related created jobs, mostly in Eastern Europe; Western European firms have in both case been the 
major  investors.  According  to  this  continent  view,  this  evolution  of  the  European  economic 
geography would be intensified, towards new members and, maybe further on, towards Ukraine, 
Georgia and other countries of the Caucasus.
Table 1. The place of Western and Eastern Europe in Foreign Direct Investment (billion dollars)
a. Inward Foreign Direct Investment (annual average 2002-2006)
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
b$ %
 EU-15  361 37,9
10 new member states 34 3,5
South-East Europe & NIS 47 4,9
Africa 29 3,0
Western Asia 32 3,4
Japan 1 0,1
China (incl. Hong Kong) 105 11,0
other East & SE Asia 59 6,1
United States 133 14,0
Latin America 101 10,6
World 953 100,0
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Source: UNCTAD
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
b. Jobs created by Foreign Direct Investment (annual average 2003-2006)
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
%
Western Europe 11,9
Central & eastern Europe 19,4
Africa 2,5
Middle East 1,0
East Asia and Pacific (industrialized countries) 2,3




                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Source: OCO consulting, IBM/PLI, 2006, in Hatem (2007)
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
3 “European Neighbourhood Policy”, European commission, May 12th 2004.
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When it comes to agriculture and subsidies, the bulk of the European subsidies would be devoted 
to the adjustment of the new eastern member states’ agriculture, in order to rapidly reach an 
homogenous agricultural European market. When it comes to regional policy, these states would 
also  benefit  from  the  main  expenditures.  Trans-European  Networks  policy  would  be  mostly 
implemented in Eastern Europe, too, for transport, telecommunication and energy facilities (DG 
Transport 2005). In one word, this view is simply the continuation of what has been occurring since 
the beginning of the 1990s. Since then, the Central and Eastern European Countries have become 
by far the greatest beneficiaries of the EU’s subsidies, in order to prepare their entry in the EU. 
The European (Commission + member states) share in terms of total assistance given to the CEEC 
has been booming. It is less so in the Balkans (where reconstruction is largely supported by the 
EU) and in the Maghreb countries; and significantly lower in the Near and Middle East, where the 
USA’s share is impressive. Since the 1990s, the EU’s share has declined in North Africa, in the Near 
and  Middle  East.  The  fact  that  CEE  countries  received  such  important  amounts  of  European 
subsidies has contributed to their credibility for private investors; the fact that these subsidies have 
been devoted to the adjustment of their fiscal, administrative and economic systems has convinced 
these investors that their territories would be very well connected to the western markets. Indeed, 
this “continental” view is strongly supported by recent and actual facts.  
Concerning regulation, for instance regulation of the telecom, or of the energy market, the stress 
would be put on the European market’s  integration: prices,  technical  coordination,  commercial 
exchanges  would  be  managed  at  this  pan-European  scale,  instead  of  the  purely  bi-national 
agreements system that organises the markets today for telecom and for energy. 
Territorial impact
The territorial impact entails several assets: 
- Trans European Networks would be implemented at a large European scale, which would be 
favourable to all the European territory;
- The German territory would become the genuine centre of Europe;
- Central and Eastern European member states would benefit from subsidies and western 
private foreign direct investments; they would quite rapidly catch up with the EU GDP’s 
average;
- The regional policy focused on these countries and namely their less developed areas would 
foster these territories.
On the other hand, this view would have territorial shortcomings: 
- Focusing  on the  EU borders’  security,  and  the  “Nimby” interpretation of  the  European 
Neighbourhood Policy, would have negative impacts on the peripheral parts of the EU’s 
space. The Mediterranean areas of the EU would be misused, especially cities like Sevilla, 
Barcelona, Marseille, Napoli, Athens, Valetta…
- The outcome is still worse on the eastern frontier. The worsening relationship between the 
Baltic States and Russia is the reason why the borders there have almost become barriers; 
the  European  Union  has  financed  high  tech  devices  for  electronic  surveillance  on  the 
border, Russians have chosen to avoid the Baltic States as logistic interfaces with the West 
(they have rather been developing new port facilities near Saint Petersburg and they have 
implemented  a  direct  sub-marine  route  for  the  new  pipeline  to  Germany  and  other 
countries of Northwest Europe). Such a path could well be extended to the whole eastern 
side of the European Union, which would diminish the dynamism of peripheral territories 
that would become some sort of dead ends or experiencing “tunnel effects”. This scheme 
would not be a winning option for Poland for example (despite the fact that this state 
favours the entry of Ukraine in the EU). Nor would it be for Romania. This latter country, as 
the other former members of the soviet world, has experienced a surprisingly rapid shift 
from a Comecon integrated trade system to a highly westernised trade. Flows toward the 
East have declined to almost nothing, whereas flows towards the West have boomed. But 
such geography is hardly sustainable, unless the EU’s regional policy funding could multiply 
in the long run to foster dead ends in the east. Last but not least, the option of an anti-
ballistic  (i.e.  anti-Russian)  defence  system that  would  be  stretched  along  the  eastern 
European border with US support, would strengthen this “dead end” eastern vision. And, 
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then,  how  about  the  actual  flows  and  historical  linkage  between  countries  like 
Romania/Moldavia, Poland/Belarus, Slovakia/Ukraine?
- Another shortcoming would certainly hamper the eastern territories. Due to the rise of 
salaries,  the  relocation  of  the  western industries  could  chose other  competitive  labour 
markets, most certainly in Asia - whereto European FDI go more and more. 
- Would the size of these eastern markets be a sufficient asset per se for Western investors? 
The answer is no. The absolute size of these markets is quite small (100 million people), 
and the population is rapidly decreasing (table 2). Briefly speaking, it can be forecast that 
the economic  rise  of  the  new member  states,  fostered  by  public  and private  Western 
European funding, would slow down quite quickly, in particular in their eastern peripheral 
areas. 
Table 2. Evolution of the share of old and new member states in EU (1995-2003)
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Population (Millions) GDP (Billions of Euros)
1995 2003 rate/year 1995 2003 rate/year
NMS12 115 113 -0.2% 230 390 6.8%
OMS15 364 375 0.4% 4141 5764 4.2%
Total 479 488 0.2% 4371 6154 4.4%
Population (%) GDP (%)
1995 2003 rate/year 1995 2003 rate/year
NMS12 24% 23% -0.4% 5% 6% 2.3%
OMS15 76% 77% 0.1% 95% 94% -0.1%
Total 100% 100% 0.0% 100% 100% 0.0%
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Source : Eurostat
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
- A general social, economic and territorial shortcoming has to be added. It deals with the 
necessity for the EU to gain new labour supply (due to the overall demographic decline of 
the Union discussed by de Abreu elsewhere in this set of papers), and especially the supply 
of skilled labour (for the Lisbon Strategy cannot be fulfilled if the EU only bases its strategy 
of attracting skilled workers invoking far and uncertain links with Asia or Latin America). A 
continental European scheme obstructing population exchanges with the neighbourhood, 
would hamper the European economy and territory as a whole, and increase its ageing (see 
ESPON Project 1.1.4 Demography). 
- Considering this concern about aging, it has to be assumed that, contrary to what is often 
said, today’s population that comes from the Mediterranean neighbouring countries and 
lives  in  Europe  is  not  numerous  –  be  they  documented  or  undocumented.  Generally 
speaking, North America hosts many more Latin Americans than Europe hosts migrants 
coming from its neighbourhoods. 15% of the US population are foreigners (of which 4% 
are undocumented); the share of Mexicans alone is almost 10%. By comparison, at most 
7% of the EU15’s population are foreigners (of which less than 1% are undocumented), the 
share from the South Mediterranean is less than 4%. The European aging population is to 
have a major impact on territories, because of shortages of labour and also because of 
local strategies based more on tranquillity than on risks and activity. In one word, this 
“continent” closed view, which Samuel Huntington would certainly acclaim, could be that of 
a giant “Swiss Europe”. 
 
2.2. The “centre-periphery” view
This view could well be regarded as a sub-category of the previous one. The difference is that here 
the  Neighbourhood  Policy  would  be  more  dynamic  –  not  as  regards   people  but  as  regards 
economic exchanges. Such a view is based on the complementarities between low-cost peripheries 
and high-tech centres, based on the assumption that Europe has a valuable area of influence that it 
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should take advantage of, and not leave to US or Asian competitors (as Chinese happen to do in 
Africa, including North Africa). 
The main political features
Several figures from our ESPON 3.4.1. work document this notion of a European area of influence. 
When it comes to labour supply, map 1 shows that, in spite of the globalisation of migration routes, 
the Mediterranean neighbouring countries remain a major source of European labour supply for the 
next 20 years and Subsaharian Africa for the next 50 years. 
Map 1: Origin of migrants in ESPON according to their country of birth
According to traditional push-pull theories, disparities between countries that are economically rich 
but demographically declining, such as Europe and countries that show a reverse profile, should, in 
a purely free market, give rise to high migration from low wealth/high population growth countries 
to high wealth/low population growth ones. Conversely, the mobility of capital could be a driving 
force of flows directed from the North to the South. 
In  the  Euro-Mediterranean  area,  the  two  main  (potentially  attractive)  poles  for  migrants  and 
(emissive) poles for capital and investments are Northwest Europe and the Persian Gulf. The net 
migration (map 2) confirms that they indeed are the main destinations of net immigration observed 
in  the  region.  The  high  number  of  net  migrants  in  Southern  European  countries  (Spain  and 
Portugal) is all the more striking, since in the 1950’s they were net-exporters to the rest of Europe. 
Southern Mediterranean countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt) and the Eastern European 
ones shown as potential senders are effectively net emigration countries and will be more and 
more the final destination for migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa because of the achievement of 
their demographic transition. In 2006, the fertility rates are only 1.74 for Tunisia and 1.89 for 
Algeria which is comparable to Finland (1.73) or France (1.84).
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Map 2: Push-Pull Factors in Euromed Area, 1999         Map 3: Net number of migrants in Euromed, 2000-05
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
The model of potential demographic and economic complementarities proposed by Grasland (2001) is based on 
the  research  on  local  equilibrium between  allocations  of  GDP and Population  at  various  scales  of  spatial 
interaction. For a given scale, we define areas with relative accumulations of wealth as compared to their 
neighbours which are represented in red, and regions with relative accumulations of population which are in 
blue. The main assumption of the model is that the contact between these two types of region can induce either 
flows of migration (from “blue” to “red”) or flows of investments and activity relocations (from “red” to “blue”). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Beyond the Mediterranean, map 4 shows the European’s commercial area of influence, that is to 
say the countries which count for Europe, while map 5 shows the areas with which Europe trades. 
The  asymmetry  is  obvious.  The  most  striking  example  is  Sub-Saharan  Africa:  while  it  is  of 
negligible importance for European trade, Europe is vital for the existence of this part of the world. 
The “centre-periphery scheme” is the continuation of these structural features.  
Map 4 % of EU in external trade of countries                  Map 5: % of each country in the external trade of Europe
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Such a North-South combination could allow Europe to compete with East-Asia and North America. 
Those two areas have achieved a huge relocation of firms and stretched a transnational productive 
system based on North-South complementarities. In the American and East-Asian cases, there is 
either little (East Asia) or much (Mexicans to United States) migration, but in both case there have 
been significant Foreign Direct Investments from industrial countries to developing countries. Out 
of 100 dollars invested out of the United States, 18 go to Latin America; out of 100 dollars invested 
out of Japan, 18 are invested in its developing or emergent East Asian peripheries. But out of 100 
invested out of Western Europe, only 10 are invested in its peripheries – all, almost, in the Central 
and Eastern European countries and less than 2 in the Mediterranean developing countries!
What if a North-South strategy were to be adopted by Europe following the centre-periphery 
pattern? These would be the results:
- the  competitive  delocalisation  would  increase  toward  eastern  but  above  all  southern 
neighbours located between the Mediterranean and the Sahara; 
- in  particular,  the undesirable European activities  would be  released to  these “friendly” 
partners.  An  example  of  the  “three  D”  activities  (dirty,  difficult,  dangerous)  is  the 
construction  of  power  plants  and  refinery  facilities:  for  environmental  reasons,  they 
become difficult to build in Europe, whereas they could be more easily built on the southern 
shore  of  the  Mediterranean,  which  urgently  need  industrial  investments,  and  would 
“benefit” from less attention to environmental issues;
- Europe would benefit from secured procurement of oil, gas and electricity (thanks to the 
ongoing connection of the electricity grid in the Euromediterranean space). Further than 
North Africa and Middle East, Europe would benefit from secured procurement of African 
raw materials;
- this North-South partnership does not mean more than the optimisation by Europe of a 
low-cost input strategy for raw materials, energy, manufacturing, as well as the services 
sectors. The friendly partners could accommodate the growing European demand for cheap 
call  centres,  of  course,  but  also: safe tourism, sanitary tourism (a growing number of 
Europeans go to Tunisia or Morocco to get surgery service in first rank hospital which only 
rich residents of Europe can afford), handsome cheap areas for retirement, and so forth.
In this context, the European Neighbourhood Policy would be used as a tool for compensation, for 
making  these  peripheral  areas  secure  and  bringing  them  into  line  with  European  standards. 
Countries  located  in  North  Africa  would  play  the  role  of  “gatekeepers”  against  Sub-Saharan 
countries with financial counterparts. As a matter of fact, this is roughly the kind of relationship 
that has until today prevailed in the Euromediterranean partnership. This is the reason why the 
recent Barcelona Summit (in November 2005 for the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Euromed 
Agreements), which was supposed to enhance the Mediterranean partnership through the new 
ambitious ENP, was a failure. Whilst all EU states where represented by the Heads of government, 
only two Mediterranean partners sent theirs. The explanation of this failure relates to the inherent 
limits of the Barcelona process: asymmetry4, paternalism, overall weak attention paid by European 
leaders towards the developing peripheries. This is reflected in the statistics for  the past decade 
when EU subsidies reached 300€ per inhabitant in Greece, 27€ in the CEE countries, but less than 
2€ in the MEDA countries.
Territorial impact
Such a pattern would enhance the European economy, and would quite deeply change the regional 
geography due to a greater Euro-Mediterranean economic integration, despite being asymmetrical. 
The 2010 Euro-Mediterranean free trade zone would accelerate the new geography of the value 
chains in all sectors, with strong impacts in the Mediterranean cities of the European Union. More 
than the eastern peripheral parts of the Union, its southern ones would benefit from this change, 
although in some sectors such as fruits and vegetables, European Mediterranean rural areas would 
be harmed by the relocation of production to the southern shore. In the short run, the European 
economy would partly catch up with its Asian and American counterparts, although not on the 
high-tech basis of the Lisbon Strategy. 
Nevertheless, 
4 Politically, the initiative and the money come from Europe. Economically, the MEDA countries are highly 
dependent  upon  western  European  markets  and  investors,  though  they  are  not  significant  partners  for 
European exports nor investments.
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- the relocation of the environmental burden to the southern shore can only be a short-term 
solution. The ongoing telluric pollution of rivers for instance would increase the pollution of 
the Mediterranean. This would help the EU to fulfil its objective of CO2 reduction according 
to the Kyoto protocol, but it would in fact be a statistical illusion as it would simply mean 
transferring the burden to the other side of the Mediterranean without any progress on 
world scale (Grasland, 2001). 
- The  prominent  policy  of  migration  control  will  diminish  the  rise  of  the  European 
Mediterranean rim.  No change would occur  in the European migration mix:  the lowest 
levels of education are observed for migration towards Southwestern Europe, that is to say 
France,  Italy,  Spain  and  Portugal  and  the  highest  towards  Northern  Europe  (Sweden, 
Norway, the UK, Ireland) and to a lesser degree towards Germany and Switzerland. In 
other words, the Mediterranean territories of Europe would not experience any in-depth 
advantage from this  centre-periphery  deal.  The most  probable  evolution would  be  the 
increase of the departure of highly skilled people’ from Africa, North Africa and the Middle 
East to North America, as it has been the case more and more during the last two decades 
(Fargues  2006).  Aside  from  this  highly  skilled  migration  to  America,  the  southern 
neighbouring countries (North Africa and Turkey) of Europe would still be “specialised” in 
low-skilled migration to Southern Europe. 
- For  the  Mediterranean  neighbouring  countries,  the  brain  drain  would  not  be  stopped, 
because  the  centre-periphery  only  offers  medium-skilled  new  jobs  to  the  developing 
peripheries. The elites would continue to leave for Northern Europe and North America. In 
the long run this would hamper the trans-Mediterranean networks. Moreover, the social 
problems of integration of southern immigrants in EU metropolitan areas would become 
worse. No doubt that in such a scenario xenophobia and racism would develop. 
- The worst consequences could be obtained if EU were to try to use North African countries 
as  gatekeepers  against  poor  migrants  from  Sub-Saharan  countries,  in  a  context  of 
increasing  pressure  induced  by  poverty,  climate  change  and  the  reduction  of  water 
resources. The thousands of people who die trying to enter the Schengen Area would be 
nothing compared to the horror of what could happen in this scenario at the gates of the 
fortress Europe. 
2.3. The “archipelago” view
The main political features
The essence of this view is the openness to global networks, free trade and deregulation, low 
European  protection  and  decreasing  subsidies.  In  this  view,  globalisation  has  overcome 
regionalisation, DG Trade has overcome DG Regio. European policies are dedicated to R&D rather 
than to regional policy or the Common Agricultural Policy. The only territorial policy promoted by 
the EU Commission would then be the TEN policy, but only for major spokes.  
Here, the Lisbon Strategy is at the top of the agenda, the commercial leading goals are the rapidly 
growing markets of East Asia and in particular China. The main European partnership remains with 
North America, far from any Euromediterranean partnership. The European Neighbourhood Policy is 
strictly  limited  to  the  implementation  of  liberal  reforms  in  the  partner  countries;  the 
Euromediterranean free trade zone becomes a purely free-trade area, implying direct competition 
with North African economies (including agriculture) as well as with any other part of the world. 
The geographical pattern is dominated by the networks. This is  Manuel Castells’ “space of flows” 
rather  than “space of  places”5,  and the liberal  (free-trade) scenario of  Espon 3.2. Due to  the 
foremost importance of capital flows, the prominent territory is the Global City (see Sassen 1991, 
2002, GaWC Taylor (2005)’s works, Brunet & Dollfus (1990)’s metropolitan archipelago). Of course 
authors like Cattan (2004) or Veltz (1996) argue that the network is more important than the 
nodes themselves: what does really matter is not to measure the power of world cities, but rather 
the degree of inter-connectivity that they provide between different parts of the world and at 
different scales. Still, the multidirectional connection to world territories is the main feature of this 
archipelago view.
5 Several  major  works  in  economic history  have stressed the importance of  how contemporary territories 
interact through trade, migration and capital flows (Dillard 1967, Kenwood & Lougheed 1989, Pollard 1991, 
Castells 1996).
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When it comes to migration, the picture is this: whereas the migrations of low-skilled workers 
follow the centre-periphery pattern, those of high-skilled workers are rather more closely aligned to 
the archipelago. Migration policy focuses on attracting international, highly skilled people, including 
those  from  the  neighbouring  countries  -  which  means  that  the  brain  drain  would  increase 
dramatically.  On  the  European  side  the  strategy  is  contrariwise  to  reduce  the  emigration  of 
researchers and young entrepreneurs, persuading them not to leave for North America. 
The archipelago view has many territorial advantages:
- most of the major European cities become highly internationalized metropolitan areas. The 
top of  the  league is  dominated  by London and Paris,  but  many others  become major 
gateway cities, connecting their country to the rest of the world (development of air flows, 
transnational  corporation networks, financial  services, international events such as fairs 
and congresses);
- western countries which benefit from such international metropolises (UK, France, northern 
Spain,  northern  Italy,  Netherlands  and  Belgium,  western  and  southern  Germany), 
experience fast economic growth; 
- the western large metropolises are more and more integrated in a top urban network, 
which increases their comparative advantage and nourishes growing profitable transport 
links between them.
It entails specific shortcomings though:
- the main one is the increase of territorial disparities in Europe: within Western Europe, in 
favor of the large metropolitan regions of the “pentagon”; in the eastern member states 
too,  because  the  emphasis  is  on  the  capital  cities.  As  a  whole,  and  according  to  the 
European Cities Monitor,  a survey realised each year on a sample of 500 managers of 
multinational firms (Cushman & Wakefield 2006), the ranking of European cities in terms of 
attractivity for international firms will not be strongly modified by EU enlargement, even if 
Budapest,  Warsaw,  Moscow  and  Prague  can  expect  some  relocations  related  to  their 
comparative advantage in (i) cost of staff, (ii) value for money of office space and (iii) 
financial incentives. But when it comes to accessibility and infrastructure, most managers 
still prefer to locate in western cities or new emerging poles of the southern periphery like 
Barcelona. 
- Quite rapidly, the eastern member states loose their competitive advantage due to the rise 
of  salaries  and  costs  in  their  capital  cities.  For  example,  the  European Cities  Monitor 
indicated in 2005 that 52% of the European firms were interested in a relocation into cities 
of the new member states of Eastern Europe, but they were only 43% in 2006. During the 
same time the project of relocation increased from 22% to 36 % for China, 22% to 30% 
for India and 21% to 28% for Eastern Europe countries outside the EU. 
- But  the  degradation  of  the  social,  economic  and  environmental  situation  is  especially 
damaging in the neighbouring countries. Eastern neighbours might benefit form the rising 
costs  in  the  CEEC, but  the bulk  of  European business  abroad  would rather  target  the 
remote large (America) and/or rapidly growing (East Asia) markets. 
- The destabilisation would be dramatic in the Mediterranean neighbouring countries. The 
tough 2010 liberalisation of trade would have a terrible impact on their trade. The situation 
in agriculture would be particularly worrisome: highly protected products such as cereals 
would disappear in less than a decade, leaving millions of farmers without revenues (three 
quarters of Moroccan farmers grow cereals, with incredibly low productivity). The pressure 
for rural emigration – probably reinforced by climate change – would get to a critical level 
and raise the illegal dwellings in the large cities’ suburbs, increasing unemployment and 
despair.  The  “push”  factor  for  migration to  Europe would be  enhanced,  but  with  little 
possibility for Europe to receive all those unskilled workers. To some extent, this rural-
urban  scenario  could  also  apply  in  the  Caucasus  countries  or  Moldavia,  where  the 
necessary agricultural adjustment is huge. No regional policy would ever compensate for 
such a destabilisation. 
- Many other sectors would be destabilised. In the logistics sector for example, European 
firms would gain  major  positions  on the  southern shore.  Until  now,  there  has been a 
striking contrast between the two shores: a modern and highly integrated system (North) 
contrasts with a scattered and highly corrupted one (South) which provides many revenues 
to many actors, but hampers the transport integration of the Euromed region and explain 
why it does not take advantage of its proximity to major markets. (Some ship coming from 
Asia deliver goods in Europe almost as rapidly as ship from South Mediterranean ports!) In 
a highly liberalised framework, this logistical integration would happen, but exclusively in 
favour of the large northern companies, provoking large job losses on the southern shore. 
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The actual crisis of textile in the northern and central regions of Tunisia is a good example 
of what could happen in the future in many sectors. 
- The  overall  result  would  be  the  deepening  of  the  divide  between  Europe  and  its 
neighbourhoods. The territorial consequences for the European peripheral territories would 
thus be negative in the long term: the growing destabilisation of the neighbours would 
harden the border, and get the future closer to the first, or “continent” scenario.
- The only neighbouring winner could well  be Russia, since the oil  and gas procurement 
would obey a purely commercial line. Europe would fail at breaking up the Russia-Algeria 
cartel in gas, because Europe would offer no valuable alternative strategy to Algeria. 
 
3. A strategic vision of Europe in a world region
As we have said, each of the three views of Europe in the world covers a part of reality. This 
section tries to arrive at a positive synthesis and proposes a desirable and feasible vision of Europe 
that would imply the territorial assets of the three former views without their main shortcomings. 
This  optimistic  vision  –  one  should  rather  say  “volontaristic”  vision  which  implies  determined 
policies, in particular in the territorial fields – is based on the idea that Europe and its neighbours 
represent  one major world region. This means that it considers the Neighbourhood Policy as the 
key policy to complement the Lisbon Strategy and to enhance all European territorial policies. 
Such a vision is, indeed, embedded in the three dominant views of Europe in the world, but in 
some sort of a politically upgrading position:
- from the centre-periphery view, it rejects paternalism and asymmetry as a strategy; but it 
focuses  on  the  reconnection  between  North  and  South,  with  an  in-depth  regulated 
relationship;
- From the archipelago view, it rejects the purely liberal aspect and the credo that territorial 
zones would no longer matter; but it accepts the openness of borders that would rather be 
hinges than barriers, since nodes are crucial for the connexion of territories, but not only at 
the global  scale;  and it  stresses  mobility  of  people  – and not  only  capital,  goods and 
services; 
- from the continent view, it rejects the purely protective aspect, the geographical approach 
of “natural facts” or “for ever existing civilisation areas”; but it accepts the necessity of 
cohesion – this time enlarged to a new, wide definition of the region, and it takes the need 
for  secured  Russian  and  Arab-islamic  territories  –  which  implies  a  strong  win-win 
connection  between  the  core  and  its  immediate  neighbours  (Mediterranean  countries, 
Ukraine,  Caucasus  countries)  and  more  distant  ones  (Sub-Saharan  Countries,  Central 
Asia).
3.1. The need for new geographical categories
It becomes more and more obvious that we need a new definition of the world sub-regions. We had 
continents  –  but  it  is  illusory  to  pretend  that  they  would  be  natural  facts  even  if  they  were 
representations of common sense shared by a majority of experts and policy makers in Europe 
(Espon 3.4.1.). In reality they are projections on the world map of the European vision of the world 
inherited from the medieval age (a unified world surrounded by an ocean and divided in three 
parts, Europe, Asia and Africa, a view itself inherited from the myth of the sons of Noah). The 
vocabulary  is  becoming  more  and  more  dubious;  what,  then,  does  the  term  “Asia”  mean? 
Increasingly, in both statistical tables or in the newspapers, the “Middle East” (from a European 
point of view) is not in Asia, though, on occasion, Australia, which formally belongs to the Oceania 
continent, is (not absurd when considering economic regionalisation and Triad zones, but puzzling 
in a cultural approach). What is at stake here is the need to see the world in a more complex way 
than in terms of “continents”. The model of global urban networks and the classic North-South 
world  are  insufficient  to  provide  us  with  convincing  geographical  concepts  that  would  help 
understand the place of Europe in the world and its territorial stakes. 
Concerning the archipelago view for instance, our ESPON report has established that the European 
territory is certainly well connected to the rest of the world by six major gateway cities (London, 
Paris, Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Zurich and Madrid) but that it can also rely on external gateways 
which enable more specific connections with the neighbouring countries, in particular Istanbul, Tel 
13
Aviv,  Dubai or Moscow. This means that between the global level and the national  level,  it  is 
possible  and  necessary  to  identify  an  intermediate  situation  of  regional networks  which  are 
specifically  able  to  organise  subparts  of  the  world  and  contribute  to  the  development  of  the 
neighbourhoods. Miami plays this role of North-South connector in America. The situation might be 
less clear in Europe, since Madrid enables preferential connections with Latin America, Paris with 
North and West Africa, London with the Persian Gulf, Frankfurt with Central Asia, and Ljubljana 
with the former Yugoslavia, etc.; but this precisely proves that there is absolutely no contradiction 
between a network view and a regional view. 
Figure 2: Regional world cities and their spheres of influence
Source: Taylor (2000)
A  major  outcome  of  our  report  for  the  practice  of  European  policy-makers  has  been  the 
introduction  of  a  supplementary  level  in  the  form  of  a  “3-level  approach”  which  has  been 
elaborated by ESPON: Europe, whatever its delimitation, is indeed not an isolated system; the 
global level should always be taken into account in order to obtain a complete view of the territorial 
stakes; last but not least, the region that encompasses Europe has to be taken into account if one 
wants to give to the “neighbourhood” its geographically accurate meaning. It is important to stress 
the growing importance of this regional level at both the world and the European scales.
But when it comes to the geographic definition of regions, the problem is that many divisions of the 
world in “regions” (clusters of states) are actually used by international organisations, be they 
private (transnational firms) or public (UN agencies etc). This makes it impossible to use any of 
them  as  a  reference  point.  We  have  therefore  produced  a  tool  that  is  an  elaboration  of  a 
harmonised hierarchical system of the world called WUTS, for World Unified Territorial System. Our 
division of the world into regions is based on four groups of criteria: mental representation (how 
firms, associations, governments usually divide the world); accessibility (morphologic distribution 
of land, population and wealth); homogeneity (structural division of the world according to levels of 
economic  and  social  development);  and  interactions  (functional  organisation  of  trade  and  air 
transport flows). This proposal is organised into five hierarchical levels, from the state level (WUTS 
5) to the world level (WUTS 0). 
As a result, at the first comprehensive level (WUTS 0) Europe, the Russian world, the eastern and 
southern neighbours of Europe as well as Africa constitute one region; the two others are America, 
and South & East Asia. More detailed levels (WUTS 2 and 3, map 6) highlight the specificity of the 
neighbours with regard to Europe (see also Europe’s area of influence on map 8). Clearly, a large 
European region,  encompassing industrialised countries and developing countries,  appears, just 
like other “North-South Regions” in East Asia and North America (including Mexico, which fits in 
with  current  analyses  of  the  country  by  international  investors  who  nowadays  regard  it  as  a 
“northern” country since FDIs are guaranteed and access to US markets is easy6).
6 since the beginning of the NAFTA agreement, Mexico has significantly increased its exports to the USA (and 
even to Canada), and has now a positive trade balance.
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The new design of the European region (neighbourhood included) conformed to the analysis of 
spatial discontinuities. In terms of GDP per capita, literacy and life expectancy, spatial transitions 
between Western Europe and its peripheries show a regular gradient in the easterly direction. 
Southward, there is a double line of discontinuity, one on the Mediterranean Sea and the other on 
the Sahara; but clearly, the main and growing discontinuity is nowadays between North Africa and 
Sub-Saharan Africa, which defines the Maghreb as a “buffer area” with regard to Europe (map 7). 
It is important to specify that the WUTS system is a technical tool elaborated by members of the 
EU for members of the EU, and not a universal proposal like could a division elaborated by the UN. 
Having this in mind, we can compare the WUTS system to the Civilisations of Huntington or the 
“Greater Middle East”, which are equivalent tools elaborated by USA for the production of their own 
vision of the world. 
Map 6: The World in 7 macro regions (WUTS2) and 17 meso regions (WUTS3)
Map 7: Diffusion of human development in the Euro-Mediterranean countries between 1975 and 2000
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Map 8 : Typology of Europe’s influence in the world
Europe’s Area of influence in the Espon 3.4.1. report
A cluster analysis  was applied to the 18 variables in order to define synthetic  types of 
relation between Europe and the rest of the World. This analysis reveals four main types of 
European external relations.
Type  B:  Responsibility:  gathers  together  the  states  for  which  Europe  has  significant 
responsibility  for  their  future  development,  primarily  because  of  Europe’s  historical 
responsibility for colonisation and the exploitation of African countries. 
Type C: Opportunity: gathers together large emerging countries (namely India and Brazil) 
located far from Europe but sharing a common language or history. They could potentially 
be very close allies.
Type D: Challenge: highlights those countries which Europe is less able to influence or to 
easily  develop  cooperative  relations  because  of  differences  in  language,  geographical 
distance, or the weakness of historical relations (South East and East Asia).
Type A: Functional Integration (North-South regions): concerns the states localised in the 
immediate neighbourhood of Europe whose trade and air relations are strongly polarised by 
Europe. 
Source: Grasland, C., in Espon (2006)
16
3.2. The rise of “North-South Regions”
Firms find many interests in locating in remote but  dynamic areas. But they also find it  very 
convenient  to  “near-shore”.  In  this  respect,  the  process  of  building  European  is  one  of  the 
numerous regional processes that are being energised by globalisation. The strategic advantages of 
proximity are all the more increasing, and so do oil price rises and transportation costs. As a result, 
regional  trade  agreements  have  multiplied  during  the  last  decade.  One  of  their  major 
characteristics  of  these  processes  is  that  they  encompass  both  North  and  South.  Deblock  & 
Regnault say (2006) that they reconnect North and South, after the large disconnection due to the 
end of colonialism and the Cold War in the second half of the 20th century. Such a reconnection, by 
the way, is the reason why UNCTAD now pleads for regionalism (Mashayekhi 20057), seen as a 
positive interface vis-à-vis globalisation. 
In our ESPON report, the use of Maddison’s data base has allowed us to give a comprehensive view 
of this new North-South geographical set. As the scale of exchanges increases, it is very useful to 
enlarge the time scope of analysis in order to understand the basic trends of the North-South 
issue. The 1950-2000 analysis of GDP and population cartography shows the decreasing share of 
rich  countries.  But  the  developing  states  located  in  their  immediate  periphery  have  generally 
experienced the reverse evolution, with a parallel increase of their share of population and GDP in 
the world. Even if their GDP per capita did not necessarily increase more quickly than the rest of 
the world, their economic and demographic size has clearly grown. The states in this situation form 
a Golden Ring of growth from Mexico to Brazil, North Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia. It 
is generally only in the deep peripheries, located at longer distance away from the Triad, that the 
worse situation of an increase in the share of population and a decrease of the share of GDP has 
become manifest.
The southern Mediterranean countries happen to be actually in the most favourable demographic 
situation for economic development, with a good proportion of young adults with relatively high life 
expectancies and a stable fertility rate, which means not too many children nor too many old 
persons to look after. This moment in history where a country has its maximum proportion of 
active population provides a unique opportunity, both for these countries and for the EU.
Map 9: Joint evolution of the share of the world population and GDP (PPS) from 1950-54 to 1996-2000
7 There have been ancient and controversial debates among economists about globalisation and regionalisation. 
From  now  on,  Unctad  is  in  favour  of the  latter  because  the  insertion  of  developing  countries  and  the 
reconnection between North and South, are more easily made through regions than through a unique global 
regulation, or through simple bilateral agreements  in which the balance of power mostly favours the North. 
Regions are not fortresses that divert or hamper free trade (open regionalism thesis). As GATT and then WTO’s 
rule allows it, regions are often the necessary step for developing countries to enter the international trade.
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North-South Regions have four assets. The first one is economic. Firms, whether they are small or 
transnational, need a regional stable location based on partnership, because they have to deal with 
the uncertainty and the challenges of globalisation. International trade (map 10) increases faster 
within the regions than with the rest of the world; growing populations live on both sides of the 
borders between two countries. In East Asia, Chinese traders’ networks have been reinforced since 
the 1990s. In the Mediterranean Area, migrant workers send more than 8 billion euros every year 
from Europe to the Maghreb country where they come from. Every day, two  million  Mexicans 
legally cross the border between Mexico and the United States. The North-South regions are the 
winning territories of globalisation (Michalet 2004). This  is mainly because they benefit from the 
complementarities between capital and technology on the one hand and a large labour force and 
booming  markets  on  the  other.  Martine  Azuelos  (2004)  has  showed  it  for  America,  Christian 
Taillard (2004) for East Asia. 
Map 10 : Regionalisation of the World based on trade flows 1996-2000
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
All things being equal in terms of economic size, some states develop 
clear regional preferences which are revealed by the map of positive 
residuals. Omitting distance in this interaction model helps to reveal 
how  the  cost  of  transportation  and  other  types  of  historical  and 
cultural proximities influence trade relations between states. At less 
12 integrated trade regions can be derived from this analysis, some 
with clear limits (e.g. southern Africa) but the majority with overlaps, 
as in the case of the Euro-Mediterranean area, which in 1996-2000, 
clearly  crosses  the  area  of  preferential  relations  with  Russia  in 
eastern  Europe.  From  these  regional  preferences,  the  map  also 
reveals a few long distance preferential trade relations, especially in 
the case of relations between the USA and eastern Asia. But above all 
it  shows that  the main economic regions in  the world encompass 
industrialised  and  developing  countries  (Canada  /  USA  /  Mexico; 
Japan / China / Tigers / Asean; Europe / Mediterranean countries). 
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Map 11: Major International air connexions in 2000 (passengers.km)
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Focusing on the connections between Europe and the rest of the world, and considering 
the  EU as  one  entity  (i.e.  excluding  intra-EU traffic),  one  can  point  out  that  several 
regional connections emerge, as for example between Buenos Aires and Santiago and Sao 
Paulo on the one hand and between Mexican cities and Los Angeles on the other. This 
means that several integration processes at the regional level are actively engaged in 
these territorial integration processes at the global level. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
The second asset is political: the regional scale has certainly become the best chance for a North-
South international regulations. The need to re-regulate the world economy is an important driving 
force in response to the excesses of the era of borderless footloose capitalism. Of course some 
rules have been implemented at the global scale such as those on trade (WTO). However, the 
failure of the WTO’s Cancun meeting concerning the Doha round (making development and free 
trade compatible)  and the  Millennium Goals,  the failure of  the  Kyoto Agenda and the lack of 
common global legislation on labour or public health show how difficult it is to regulate the wide 
world.  For  example,  Grasland  (2001)  argues  that  the  reduction  of  CO2 is  impossible  with  an 
international approach (where each state defends its own interest) and suggests the organisation 
of three regional agencies mixing developed and developing countries according to the WUTS1 
division of the world. The regional scale can be seen as more relevant for the introduction of new 
public policies, due to the complementarities between the national economies concerned, common 
environmental stakes (pollution of rivers, seas and air), shared cultural values – or at least an 
understanding  of  each  other’s  cultural  values,  historical  links,  migratory  flows,  and  any  other 
assets important in creating win-win co-development. 
This is why regional trade agreements have multiplied worldwide in the last fifteen years, and why 
existing  agreements  have  been  re-invigorated  with  new  environmental  or  social  concerns.  As 
demonstrated by the French economist J.M. Siroën (2000), the debate over the economic benefits 
of multilateralism and regionalisation at world scale is a false one because both forms of global 
integration are in fact complementary. What is really important is not the liberalisation of trade 
(which is not an objective in itself) but rather “the question of defining the scale where public 
goods and services can be produced the most efficiently according to the cost and the preferences 
of  societies  for  certain  specific  characteristics  which  are  often  associated  with  geographical  
territories.” The European reader will easily recognize the principle of subsidiarity here which is the 
basis for the political organisation of the European Union.
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The third asset is cultural: it is more relevant to define collective preferences on this regional scale 
than  on a global one. The fourth asset is geopolitical: regionalisation is the best and maybe the 
only way to impose multilateralism on the United States, because they would have to deal with 
strong  European  and  Asian  regions,  and  because  these  regions  promote  a  more  regulated 
liberalism than the one found in NAFTE – even if this North American liberalism is not as “pure” as 
Europeans may think…
3.3. North-South regionalism and European economic stakes
This notion of “region” is thus a key territorial, economical and analytical issue. It is of utmost 
importance to distinguish between the two geographical notions of “Europe”. (i) The first notion is 
the institutional one. “Europe” means the EU. Its borders are established, not necessarily forever 
(the Western Balkans will enter one day and perhaps Turkey), but at any time they are precisely 
defined. (ii) The second one is what we may call the functional “Europe.” This means the Euro-
Mediterranean (Euro-Africa in a wider sense) which is the socio-economic region in which Europe is 
embedded. Its geography is unclear; its borders vary according to the index one uses (very large 
when it comes to commercial trade, less so when it comes to pollution of the sea). But in any case 
its dimension is broader than the institutional definition of the EU. The geographical difference 
between the two definitions is the “neighbourhood”. 
Compared to that of eastern neighbours, the potential demographic and economic dynamism of the 
North African and Middle Eastern countries is a major opportunity for Europe, the harvesting of 
which probably provides the only possible way of maintaining its position as a global actor. The 
share of population and GDP of Europe at world scale decreased between 1950 and 2004. During 
this period however, although this structural decline continued, it was always counterbalanced by 
the dynamics of EU enlargement. The question is: what will happen once enlargement is over? 
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The response is: European Neighbourhood Policy. But, if this policy were to be the continuation of 
the asymmetric  Barcelona process,  if  the major  part  of the European Neighbourhood financial 
instrument were to go to the eastern neighbours, if European firms keep on targeting Eastern 
Europe and remote developing countries rather than this enormous potential of the Mediterranean 
markets, and if the Arab countries refrain to speed up their very necessary reforms, the two shores 
of the Mediterranean will have missed the opportunity of a North-South reconnection that should 
be further completed by an equivalent connection between the northern and southern shores of 
Sahara. 
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If  Europe  and  its  neighbours  were  as  economically  integrated  as  Japan  and the  other  Asian 
countries around it, the growth of EU’s GDP would be 0.5 points higher, and that of France’s GDP 
0.75 points. The studies of the Cercle des Economistes (Chevalier 2003) and IFRI (Colombani 
2002) have shown that, up to 2050, there is only one scenario in which Europe catches up with 
North America and East Asia: the scenario of south- and eastward regional integration. Moreover, 
this  is  the  only  scenario  in  which Europe’s  neighbours  develop  significantly.  Almost  all  of  the 
Mediterranean  neighbours  face  high  rates  of  structural  unemployment,  due  to  their  economic 
structures, their lack of economic reform, the need to modernise their agricultural systems which 
will have severe effects on employment, and the persistence of numerous internal and external 
conflicts. In addition, they also face growing competition from other developing countries (e.g. the 
entrance of China into the WTO, and the dismantling of import quotas in the textile industry). They 
dearly need a strong partnership with Europe. 
The EU has a vital role to play here. Firstly, the EU must help its neighbours to create a reliable 
legal  background  for  investments  in  order  to  help  with  the  creation  of  the  urgently  needed 
thousands of jobs. Otherwise, a continuing flow of undocumented immigrants will turn Europe’s 
borders into ramparts. Secondly, the EU will  increasingly need labour force recruits in order to 
compensate for its demographic decline and shortage of labour documented by de Abreu elsewhere 
in this set of papers. This labour force could in large part be taken from the neighbouring countries. 
The lack of a common policy framework, particularly in respect of teacher training, prevents the 
southern neighbours from tackling the huge increase in new students that it is confronted with. 
This takes us to a political issue: that of the philosophy of regional integration. The European 
states have a crucial choice to make between (i) remaining a continental integrated area based on 
homogeneity: gathering together comparable countries, with cohesion as the main goal, through a 
process promoted mainly by states through public policies - what could be called “convergence 
regionalism”.  And  (ii)  building  a  more  ambitious  entity  with  the  southern  and  eastern 
Mediterranean countries: a “North-South regionalism” gathering together uneven countries, with 
economic growth as the main goal, through a process promoted by firms, e.g. NAFTE or “ASEAN 
Plus  Three”  (Japan,  South  Korea,  China)8.  Needless  to  say  that  this  second  pattern  of 
regionalisation presents much better economic results than the first one. 
3.4. Political stakes
Security issues and the fear of terrorism have come to preoccupy the Barcelona process which was 
initially based on a much wider vision of join economic, social, ecological and cultural development 
on both sides of the Mediterranean. In the short term, and out of any moral consideration, any 
“bunker-continent”  or  “center-periphery”  strategy  could  appear  realistic  for  an  economically 
declining and demographically ageing Europe. In reality, this construction of an island of prosperity 
surrounded by oceans of poverty would have tragic consequences:
- migrations have never been stopped by borders when wealth differentials are greater than 
1 to 5. In such a scenario, the European Union would be obliged to invest more and more 
in the military control of its southern border. In a contex of limited economic growth, this 
policy option will necessarily imply limiting EU budget allocations to other objectives like 
social cohesion, sustainable development or R&D;
- the developing states of the southern shore of the Mediterranean will never agree to the 
proposal of being simple gatekeepers for the European Union against the poorest societies 
of Sub-Saharan Africa. They could therefore develop partnerships with other parts of the 
world like the United States (its Great Middle East project) or China, instead of being allied 
to Europe and would become competitors in Europe’s immediate neighbourhood; 
- the integration of  immigrants  from the southern shore of  the  Mediterranean would be 
profoundly affected by the limitation on travel  and family reunification,  multiplying the 
problems in Europe’s inner cities and suburban ‘ghettos’. Conversely, tourism flows and the 
retirement of European people to southern countries would be dramatically affected by the 
degradation of political relations, producing increasing economic and ecological pressure on 
the coastal areas of the northern shore of the Mediterranean; 
- the psychological climate of the European Union would be affected by the climate of fear 
and guilt produced by Europe’s isolation from the poorest people of Africa. The universal 
dimension of the European project would be seen as hypocritical. Moreover, this global 
8 The December 2005 Kuala Lumpur Summit enhanced the notion of an “East Asian Region” or “ASEAN Plus 
Five” since Australia and New Zeeland attended the Summit and discussed their participation.
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degradation of the international image of Europe could have significant negative political 
consequences.
3.5. Territorial stakes
This regulated regional vision has an important territorial side (see Beckouche & Richard 2005): 
- the European region (that  is  Europe + neighbours,  we say “European” region because 
Europe represents 50 to 80% of any economic and social exchanges for the non European 
countries of  the region) should become a reference in the regulation of agricultural  or 
energy (gas and electricity) markets. For the latter this means that the – slow and difficult 
-  regulation  of  the  European  market  should  right  away encompass the  southern 
neighbours,  the  facilities  of  which  are  very  compatible  with  those  of  Western  Europe 
(contrarily  to  eastern new member  states),  and  some of  which  have  strategic  energy 
resources. For the former (agriculture) this means that Europe and its neighbours should 
negotiate a regional set of regulations with the WTO, for example through a regional label 
for Mediterranean products, maybe even through a regional tariff in order to protect and 
promote  the  modernisation  of  agriculture  on  the  southern  shore  during  the  period  of 
transition. 
Regional regulation. The case of Mediterranean agriculture
One of the most relevant examples of the need for a win-win regional production and 
regulation  process  is  agriculture  and  the  food  industry.  The  current  situation  is 
suboptimal. Some typically southern products such as citrus fruits or olive trees are also 
produced along the northern shore, whilst some typically northern products such as wheat 
are produced on the southern shore. In Morocco, 1.3 out of the 1.4 million agricultural 
farms produce wheat, most with incredibly low productivity and small profit margins. The 
inescapable downsizing of agricultural subsidies, on both shores of the Mediterranean, will 
see this situation progressively worsen. The winner however will be neither the northern 
nor  the  southern  shore,  but  rather  Chile,  Australia  or  California,  all  of  which  are 
industrializing their food production industries. What has to be done then is a rational re-
location of production within the Euro-Mediterranean area, the development of the food 
industry related to these products on the southern shore, and the common promotion of 
regional Mediterranean products.  
Actual  trends  as  well  as  possible  common  responses  to  the  challenging  nature  of 
international competition will have an increasing impact on the rural areas of both shores 
of the Mediterranean. Highlighting the necessity of an overall regional view would help in 
the modernization of the Common Agricultural Policy, especially its second pillar (rural 
development) in the framework of the ENP. 
- The ENP should manage this transition time in order to prepare the liberalisation of the 
2010  (in  fact  probably  rather  2013  because  the  agreements  between  EU  and  the 
neighbours  entail  transitional  periods)  free  trade  zone.  In  2013 either  the  southern 
Mediterranean countries will have given up free trade agreements with Europe, so that the 
Mediterranean will become an actual barrier for a long time to come – and the “continent” 
view will  have won. Or they will  have accepted the rough free trade that the ongoing 
negotiations are promoting, and the “archipelago” will have won. In both case, this kind of 
partnership will  be unlikely to avoid  the destabilisation of the South and therefore  of the 
whole region. Alternatively, a genuine regional regulation will have  been implemented in 
order both to allow an effective transition period for the southern shore and to deepen the 
partnerships between North and South.
- A  policy  of  networking  the  common  regional  Euro-Mediterranean  territory  would  be 
implemented: gas and electricity, but also transports and logistics, telecom, an Euromed 
postal network, an Euromed financial space (under way thanks to the European Investment 
Bank), a common structure of diplomas in order to promote the mobility of the skilled 
people. 
- Common policies would regulate regional public goods. In particular, several environmental 
issues have a regional dimension. These include the pollution of common seas (Black and 
22
Mediterranean Sea, the pollution of which was one of the main issues of the November 
2005 Barcelona Summit); air pollution, nuclear risks relating to the maintenance of the 
antiquated power-plants in the East, the expectation of new ones (Russia on the Black 
Sea’s coast) and the potential building of new plants in the Mediterranean (potentially in 
Turkey, Egypt and Algeria after 2010). 
- Balanced  relocation  of  the  value  chain  between  North  and  South  would  enhance  the 
competitive advantage of the complementary and neighbouring territories, especially if the 
price of oil remains high and limits the comparative advantage of long-distance trade (Cf. 
the different scenarios of an oil crisis presented in the ESPON project 3.2). 
- Mobility of the elites, of other workers and students would be promoted, so that the fourth 
freedoms of the ENP, that of the circulation of people9, could ultimately be met, instead of 
a brain drain. For what the people in the southern shore want is not to emigrate to Europe, 
what they want is  to have easy opportunities to  go there and come back as often as 
necessary. 
3.5. Territorial impacts
This wide regional vision would undoubtedly have very positive impacts on demography and the 
economy overall, as well as specific territorial impacts:
- The main one would of course be the rise of the peripheral parts of the EU’s territory, 
eastward (and not only in capital cities) and mostly southward. 
- The networking of the Euromed space would give a gateway function to many ports and 
cities on both shores of the Mediterranean rim. Many partnerships, such as decentralised 
cooperation, between actors of North and South would be facilitated, enhancing mobility, 
the way of life and of work astride the two shores. 
- The regional integration of the Western Balkans and Turkey would be facilitated.
- The role of North Africa as an interface between Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa would be 
fostered. Maghreb would no longer be a buffer state, but a true interface. 
4. Conclusion about policies: the role of territories in the Euromediterranean economic 
development implies coordination between DG Relex and DG Regio
4.1. Four principles of common action 
Throughout its Action Plans with each of the Mediterranean partners, the ENP promotes the four 
freedoms. As we explained, they are necessary but not sufficient: four principles of common action 
have to be added to this motto: 
- the solidarity with the southern shore of the Mediterranean (and over a longer time span 
with Sub-Saharan Africa) in order to prevent  any outburst of  social  unrest: aid for the 
building  of  dwellings  and  for  setting  up  basic  services  where  they  are  lacking;  aid  to 
manage a transition for the rural space in order to avoid the dramatic consequences that a 
crude  liberalisation  of  agricultural  trade  could  have  on  migrations.  Several  European 
policies  should  be  expanded  to  the  Mediterranean  Partner  Countries:  the  EU’s  Rural 
Development policy should be extended to the southern rural  space providing essential 
services,  improving competitiveness,  protecting the environment and introducing locally 
based bottom-up approaches (a “Leader Med” has already been prepared by EU and Arab 
countries). By the way, combining the CAP and the ENP would certainly be the best way to 
avoid a rapid decline of the CAP, the legitimacy of which is at stake; Europeans as well as 
the WTO would certainly not like to extend this policy after 2013 – but they could accept it, 
if it were associated to a North-South integration policy. In urban and regional areas, the 
tools  of the European regional policy could be profitably used.  The example of  Turkey 
shows that the neighbouring countries can very actively adopt the philosophy and methods 
of  European  territorial  policies  when  there  is  a  strong  European  commitment.  This 
commitment  consists  in  money  of  course,  but  essentially  in  methods  and  political 
9 Some analysts already figure out how to set the Shengen line… on the Sahara.
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involvement. Indeed, there is a lot of money in these countries; every year, billions of 
Euros cross the Mediterranean to be invested in Europe since there are no local reliable 
opportunities. The ongoing project of a Euro-Mediterranean financial space could very well 
create  the  conditions  for  secured  and  reliable  investment  on  the  southern  shore.  The 
Persian  Gulf  could  appear  in  this  scheme  as  a  complementary  partner  rather  than  a 
competitor of the European Union for investments. The idea is to make such investments in 
local development projects. 
- The creation of meshing networks over the greater regional territory: the development of 
banking services connecting the two shores, integrated transport and electricity networks, 
a  well-connected  transmediterranean  urban  system,  and  compatible  patterns  of  higher 
education’s degrees in order to  promote  mobility. The related European policies here are 
the TENs which have begun to be studied at an Euro-Mediterranean scale (see for instance 
the EIB working group on Euromed transport and logistics). The Bologna process is  at 
stake too, as the recent Tarragona Declaration by the Universities willing to actually create 
the Euromed higher education & research space shows. Other common policies should take 
a Euromed path, namely the regulation of gas and electricity markets  - discussions on 
those topics have begun in 2003 between the EU and the MPC.
- The  North-South  economic  complementary:   a  better  sharing  of  the  value  chain  in 
agriculture and manufacturing or  services,  after  a  pattern developing in  East  Asia  and 
North America; cross  investment  between firms of the North and the South in order to 
restore  enduring  mutual  confidence.  No  European  policy  is  involved  here,  since  this 
concerns firms. But the EU has a main role to play in enhancing this industrial cooperation 
as a key component of the Lisbon Strategy. The EU should say clearly that, if Europe wants 
to cope with the USA and Japan, it has to embrace the North-South regionalism that allows 
them to surpass us. 
- The  common  interest  in  regional  public  goods:  promotion  of  democracy,  common 
agreement to promote regional regulation and tariffs  vis-à-vis  the WTO and the World 
Bank,  and  the  fight  against  air  and  sea  pollution.  In  the  framework  of  the  European 
Sustainable Strategy launched in 2004, the EU has initiated common actions in the field of 
the environment (for instance the “2020 Horizon” for the de-pollution of the Mediterranean 
coordinates  the  various  plans  developed  by  bordering  countries,  UNEP  and the  Global 
Environment Fund). The overall stake here concern the negotiations with WTO and the way 
the EU would consider Euromed as its reference regional area. 
The Euromed free trade zone between the EU and the Mediterranean Partners Countries will come 
into  force  in  2010  –  more  probably  in  fact  by  2012  or  2013.  Then,  either  the  southern 
Mediterranean  countries  will  have  given  up  free  trade  agreements  with  Europe,  and  the 
Mediterranean will  thus become  the true  frontier that fits  in with Samuel Huntington’s bunker-
continental view concerning the relationship between Europe and the Arab-Muslim world. Or they 
will have adopted the unmitigated free trade that the ongoing negotiations are promoting, but then 
this kind of partnership will  be unlikely to avoid the destabilisation of the South and therefore of 
the  whole  region.  Alternatively,  public  policies  and  a  real  regional  regulation  will  have  been 
implemented in order both to allow a transition period for the southern shore and to deepen the 
partnerships between North and South.
4.2. The need for crossing DG Relex and DG Regio
These European policies expanded southwards deal very much with territories, for many reasons:
- efficient local territories are nowadays a genuine factor of production. Therefore territorial 
action is necessary to enhance the economic development of the Euromed countries. By 
enhancing the local dimension of ENP projects with a strong commitment from local public 
and private actors, the EU could more easily monitor the implementation of projects and 
make regular evaluations, using a similar system to that used in the context of European 
regional policy. 
- Many social  issues in the South cannot be met without taking the local territories into 
account, were it in rural areas or in informal urban suburbs;
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- The promotion of local actors is a key means for democratising the South. The promotion 
of  local  projects  is  one  way  in  which  to  encourage  decentralisation  in  neighbouring 
countries,  which  happens to  be  poorly  developed.  Although expectations  of  immediate 
changes to the political organisation of these countries’ local structures are unrealistic, the 
initiation of such a process could, ultimately, improve their development and the efficiency 
of  cross-border  cooperation  programmes.  Decentralised  cooperation  and  cooperation 
between NGOs of the two shores of the Mediterranean are today’s best ways to build an in-
depth North-South regionalism.
- Last but not least there is a need for coordination of these various territorial actions, be it 
at the local or at the regional level. 
That is why DG Regio should have a prominent role here: its methods for local development have 
proved efficient; its connexion to local actors and especially to European regional councils would 
facilitate  their  involvement  in  the  Euromed  region;  its  know-how  of  drawing  overall  regional 
strategies  is  very  useful  because  the  region  needs  a  comprehensive  vision  of  the  Euro-
Mediterranean territory – which certainly  neither  the  bilateral  Action Plans  nor  the ENP’s  four 
freedoms meet. The EU’s Territorial Agenda should point the way to an “Euro-Mediterranean or 
Euro-African Spatial Development Perspective”.
Our geographical analysis shows: how important the ENP is to fulfil the goals of the Lisbon strategy 
(we do not believe that the “continent” view of Europe could be a relevant vision for Europe); how 
necessary  it  is  to  enhance  territorial  projects  within  the  ENP  if  one  wants  to  avoid  a  rough 
confrontation between the two shores of the Mediterranean (the “centre-periphery” view); how 
obvious it is that regional territories matter, that a purely hub-and-spokes pattern cannot meet the 
needs of sustainable development (the “archipelago” view), that  globalisation does not mean the 
abolition of borders but rather the reallocation of national borders to an upper scale which is that of 
the world region10. Therefore it also shows how relevant it is to have strong coordination of Euro-
Mediterranean  territorial  policies.  Indeed,  from  the  very  beginning  cross-cutting  actions  and 
budgets of DG Relex, which is actually in charge of the ENP, and DG Regio should be boosted, in 
the interest of a European region’s policy.
4.3. Fifty years ago …
On the 4th of July 2005, the president of the European Commission was invited to the opening 
session of the African Union Assembly. In a declaration entitled "From Schuman to Sirte: a tale of 
two unions” (Barosso 2005), he drew a parallel between the story of European and African Union, 
Let me start with an affirmation about the organisation of a continent. 
The contribution which an organized and living Africa can bring to civilization is indispensable 
to the maintenance of peaceful relations…Africa will not be made all at once, or according to  
a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto  
solidarity.
If  this  sounds vaguely  familiar  to  you,  you shouldn’t  be  surprised.  Replace  ‘Africa’  with 
‘Europe’, and you have the famous Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950. This set in motion 
an unprecedented period of integration and co-operation which has delivered 50 years of  
peace and prosperity on my continent.
At first glance, the discourse was full of ambition, as the President of the Commission continues the 
speech with a generous proposal of partnership or a pact between both sides of the Mediterranean 
…
Regional integration has transformed - is transforming - the face of both Africa and Europe.  
But it has also altered our relationship. Today, we can, we must, do more to put in place a  
new and solid political partnership between an enlarged Europe and a re-emerging Africa.  
Today, in this city which has come to symbolize the ideal of African unity, I call on you to 
elaborate with your European partners on the other side of the Mediterranean an ambitious 
Euro-Africa Pact. 
10 See  Krugman  (2004):  “Distance  matters  a  lot,  though  possibly  less  than  it  did  before  modern 
telecommunications.  Borders  also  matter  a  lot,  though  possibly  less  than  they  did  before  free  trade 
agreements. The spaceless, borderless world is still a Platonic ideal, a long way from coming into existence”.
25
A Pact that should reassess the principles and values that govern our relationship. Equality,  
true ownership and dialogue should replace guilt or charity as the determining features of  
our partnership.
But the devil is in the details … Looking more closely at the speech of Mr Barosso shows clearly that 
the real message was the net affirmation of a continental vision which separates definitively the 
destiny of both shore of the Mediterranean. Let Africans follow their own path of development 
means in this case that they should cease all hope for more than a friendly partnership with Europe 
based on a clear division in  continents, which is not so far from Huntington’s point of view on 
civilisations. A few weeks after the speech of Mr Barrosso, the European Union had the opportunity 
to prove the reality of its “Pact” to Sub-Saharan immigrants waiting outside the gates of Europe 
around the Spanish enclave of Melilla on African soil. As explained by Faludi (2006): 
In late-September 2005, an estimated one thousand of them scaled the three-meter wall  
surrounding it, with three hundred making it to Spanish – and thus European – territory  
where they enjoy a degree of protection under international law. In subsequent nights, the 
police was on the alert, and there were ugly scenes and even uglier ones when Moroccan 
authorities called upon to co-operate relocated would-be refugees to the Sahara Desert.  
Another surreal answer was to increase the height of the walls surrounding Melilla to six 
meters…
If the President of the European Commission had better read the famous declaration of Robert 
Schuman, he could have noticed this small but very crucial sentence where he explains what could 
be a better use of European prosperity:
With increased resources Europe will be able to pursue the achievement of one of its essential  
tasks, namely, the development of the African continent.
Of course, it is true that R. Schuman was also speaking about a “continent”, like J.M. Barosso. And, 
of course, we cannot ignore the context of the colonial crisis that existed at this moment of history 
which makes different and contradictory interpretations of Schuman’s sentence possible. But we 
strongly  support  the  assumption  that  the  man  who  declared  that  “World  peace  cannot  be 
safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it” 
would certainly not have supported the morbid vision of civilisations held by Huntington, neither 
the soft variant of “continent” which is actually dominating European debate. 
The long-term impetus that Schuman’s Plan gave to Europe relies precisely on the fact that it 
appeared extremely ambitious and – according to many observer at the time – unrealistic. As 
quoted by Mark Twain : they did not know it was impossible so they managed to do it. 
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